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Abstract
Background: Subsidizing healthcare costs through insurance schemes is crucial to overcome financial barriers to
health care and to avoid high medical expenditures for patients in China. The health insurance could decrease
financial risk by less out-of-pocket (OOP) payment, but not promise the protection equity. With the growth of New
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) financing and coverage since 2008, the protection effectiveness and equity of
the modified NCMS policies on financial burden should be further evaluated.
Methods: A cross-sectional household survey was conducted in Zhejiang, Hubei, and Chongqing provinces by
multi-stage stratified random sampling in 2011. A total of 1,525 households covered by the NCMS were analyzed.
The protection effectiveness and protection equity of NCMS was analyzed by comparing the changes in health care
utilization and medical expenditures, and the changes in the prevalence of catastrophic health expenditure (CHE)
and its concentration indices (CIs) between pre- and post-NCMS reimbursement, respectively.
Results: The medical financial burden was still remarkably high for the low income rural residents in China due to
high OOP payment, even after NCMS reimbursement. In Hubei province, the OOP payment of the poorest quintile
was almost same as their households’ annual expenditures. Even it was higher than their annual expenditures in
Chongqing municipality. Effective reimbursement ratio of both outpatient and inpatient services were far lower
than nominal reimbursement ratio originally designed by NCMS plans. After NCMS reimbursement, the prevalence
of CHE was considerably high in all three provinces, and the absolute values of CIs were even higher than those
before reimbursement, indicating the inequity exaggerated.
(Continued on next page)
* Correspondence: jingwang@hust.edu.cn
2Department of Health Management, School of Medicine and Health
Management, Tongji Medical College, Huazhong University of Science and
Technology, Hubei 430030, China
3The Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Science of Hubei
Province, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hubei 430030,
China
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 Ma et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Ma et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:72 
DOI 10.1186/s12939-016-0361-5
(Continued from previous page)
Conclusion: Policymakers should further modify NCMS policy in rural China. The high OOP payment could be decreased
by expanding the drug list and check directory for benefit package of NCMS to minimize the gap between nominal
reimbursement ratio and effective reimbursement ratio. And the increase in medical expenditures should be controlled
by monitoring excess demand from both medical service providers and patients, and changing fee-for-service payment
for providers to a prospective payment system. Service accessibility and affordability for vulnerable rural residents should
be protected by modifying regressive financing in NCMS, and by providing extra financial aid and reimbursement from
government.
Keywords: China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme, Financial burden, Inequity, Catastrophic health expenditure,
Concentration index
Backgrounds
If taken as a major source of healthcare financing, out-of-
pocket (OOP) payment, which is income-related, would
cause disease-related financial burden for patients. More-
over, the OOP-based health financing was regressive,
which made the poor pay a larger share of their incomes
for OOP payment than the rich [1]. Russell S. emphasized
that abandonment of needed care because of the limited
payment capacity can lead to worse health, less productiv-
ity and income, and increased poverty [2]. Bowser et al.
found that the heavy financial burden was caused not only
by ill health but also by the inequitable distribution of
disease-related financial burdens [3].
Subsidizing healthcare costs through insurance schemes
is crucial to overcome financial barriers to health care and
to avoid high medical expenditures [4]. Without an effect-
ive insurance coverage, households would have to rely on
informal healthcare payment arrangements, such as using
savings, borrowing money, selling assets, cutting food ex-
penditures, or halting children from schooling [2]. So, uni-
versal health insurance coverage is regarded as a solution
to alleviating disease-related financial burden.
The effectiveness of appropriate health insurance plans
in financial protection has been well documented. In
Turkey, risk pooling/health insurance was found to be
beneficial and better protected people from catastrophic
health expenditure (CHE) than other individuals with
comparable income levels in other countries [5]. Laos
[6] and Ireland [7] provided a universal health insurance
through implementing new schemes or modifying exist-
ing policies, to decrease the population’s disease-related
financial burden.
However, the reduction of OOP payment by health in-
surance corresponds to the contribution to the absolute
decrease in financial burden, the equity of benefits from
health insurance should be further investigated. Studies by
Gwatkin D. and Wagstaff A. showed that the illness dispro-
portionately afflicted the population and the poor were the
most vulnerable populations because they would suffer a
heavy financial burden, if health insurances failed to in-
crease payments for the utilization of health services [8, 9].
Xu et al. emphasized that less households were likely af-
fected by catastrophic payments only when OOP payment
was reduced to levels lower than 15 % of the total medical
expenditure [4]. Although the healthcare reform in
Colombia was based on social insurance to reduce financial
barriers to healthcare access and thus had shown an im-
pact on OOP financing for the poor [10], health insurances
could not ensure to decrease the regressivity. For instance,
inequalities in OOP health care financing in Poland have
decreased since the universal health care system was intro-
duced in 1999, but they increased again in 2006 [1]. Fur-
thermore, accessibility-related problems in lower income
populations can persist even in countries with a universal
health insurance coverage [11].
In China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), a
voluntary insurance scheme designed for rural residents,
was founded in 2003. The enrollment rate of NCMS grad-
ually increased and has achieved 97.5 % in 2011. The
scheme is co-financed by individuals, local government,
and central government with a county as a risk pooling
unit. The average annual flat-rate premium per capita of
NCMS was 246 Chinese Yuan (¥) (US$37.14 based on the
exchange rate on January 1, 2011) in 2011, including ¥200
($30.20) from the government and ¥46 ($6.95) from rural
residents. While in 2015, the flat-rate premium per capita
of NCMS increased to 500 Chinese Yuan (¥) (US$80.65
based on the exchange rate on January 1, 2015) on aver-
age, including ¥380 ($61.29) from the government and
¥120 ($19.35) from rural residents.
Although reimbursement guidelines have been issued by
the central government, the design and benefit packages
of the NCMS in each county possibly differ. The NCMS
plans in majority of the counties originally focused only
on protecting against inpatient expenses with low ceiling,
high deductible, and high co-insurance rates according to
the limited funding pool [12, 13]. Thus, the effective reim-
bursement ratio (ERR) was very low in many counties. In
particular, outpatient services were not initially covered by
the NCMS. Wagstaff et al. found that the NCMS at that
time took no effects on OOP payment, although it posi-
tively affected the utilization of health services between
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2003 and 2005 [13] . In a field survey study, Sun et al.
found that the OOP medical payments remained a burden
for rural households in 2005 [14]. Yip et al. mentioned
that the NCMS ignored to reduce the financial burden of
outpatient medical expenditure of poor communities
with chronic diseases [15]. Thus, the financial protec-
tion against high healthcare expenditures remained very
restricted among the poor in rural China [13], because
approximately 54 % of medical expenditures related to
outpatient services for chronic disease had not been
covered by the NCMS [16].
With the growth of NCMS financing and coverage
since 2008, the modified NCMS policies engaged in en-
hancing the financial protection to achieve the objectives
of the universal health insurance defined by the World
Health Organization (WHO) [17]. The nominal reim-
bursement ratio (NRR) of inpatient services within the
benefit packages had been set as 70 % in township hos-
pitals, which were the lowest level institutions to provide
inpatient services, since 2011. Furthermore, outpatient
services have been generally covered with a NRR of 50 %
in primary health institutions (including village clinics and
township hospitals) in rural China since 2011, and the
NRR of outpatient services for some chronic diseases,
such as hemodialysis and aplastic anemia, was 70 %.
However, the protection effectiveness and protection
equity of the NCMS plans on financial burden should be
further evaluated. Although equity was not the main de-
signed goal of health insurances, the needy deserve extra
protection to avoid income-based inequity. Therefore,
this study aimed to: 1) examine the protection effective-
ness of NCMS under current polices by analyzing the
health care utilization and medical expenditures, 2) inves-
tigate the protection fairness by comparing the changes in
the prevalence of CHE and its concentration indices (CIs)
among different income-level household groups, between
pre- and post-NCMS reimbursement.
Methods
Sampling
A cross-sectional household survey was conducted in
three provinces, Zhejiang, Hubei, and Chongqing dir-
ectly under the central government, in 2011, which were
in the Eastern, Central, and Western regions of China,
respectively. Households were sampled by multi-stage
stratified random sampling. Three counties in high-,
medium-, and low-income levels were selected respect-
ively from each province. Then, 2 towns from each
county, 2 villages from each town, and 50 households
from each village were randomly selected. The design
samples comprised 1,800 households. Households in
which some members did not participate in NCMS but
in other medical insurance plans such as Urban Em-
ployee Basic Medical Insurance or Urban Resident Basic
Medical Insurance were excluded from this study. In
addition, the invalid questionnaires (loss of important in-
formation or with logical error) also were excluded. Finally
a total of 1,525 questionnaires regarding households were
qualified and analyzed in this study.
Information on socioeconomic characteristics, health
care utilization, and medical expenditures of each member
of the investigated households was collected by the slightly
modified questionnaire used in the fourth National Health
Services Survey in China 2008.
Definition of key variables
OOP payment included all categories of health-related
expenses paid directly by the household at the time the
household received the health service, typically including
doctors’ consultation fees, medication purchases, and
hospital bills [18]. In this study, the OOP payment in-
cluded the payment for co-insurance, co-payments, de-
ductibles of outpatient services with a recall period of
two weeks, those of inpatient care with a recall period of
one year preceding the survey, and other payments for
medicines, items and services not covered by insurance.
However, the insurance premiums were excluded because
this study focused on the measurement of the financial
burden directly related to the illness.
CHE was defined as OOP payment exceeding a certain
threshold in a given period, and threshold was calculated
by medical expenditures sharing of household income or
expenditure [19]. However, some households could achieve
a consumption level higher than their income by mobiliz-
ing additional resources, such as borrowing money or sell-
ing assets [20]. The ability to pay, which was defined as the
household expenditure that subtracted food expenditure
from the total household consumption [4], was a more
accurate indication of purchasing power than income re-
ported in household surveys in many countries [18]. While
in rural China, most residents are non-employed, and they
obtain their food by self-production, the ability to pay was
hard to accurately measure. Deaton et al. pointed out that
in the territories that were characterized by substantial
household-based production, lack of formal labor markets
and high variability in household income across time, the
value of household expenditure could be used as a proxy
for permanent income and ability to pay [21]. So, in this
article, the threshold of CHE was defined as OOP of a
household over 40 % of the total household expenditure,
according to the threshold of the WHO [18].
Concentration index (CI) measured the equitability of
the distribution of an indicator across households with dif-
ferent incomes [22]. CI ranges from −1 to 1, with a value
of 0 indicating a complete equality of the indicator across
income groups. And the indicator was more equitable
when CI was closer to 0. Negative CI values implied that
the indicator was concentrated among households with
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low incomes, whereas positive values showed that the in-
dicator was concentrated among households with high
incomes.
Besides, variables that self-reported illness and doctor
suggesting inpatient were used to reflect the health need
of the surveyed households, and variables that outpatient
utilization and inpatient utilization were used to reflect
their health utilization. The detailed definition of each
variable analyzed in this study and their abbreviations
were set out in Table 1.
Analysis
The sampled households in each province were classified
respectively into quintiles from the poorest to the richest
(Q1 to Q5) on the basis of the annual household income
level. The differences in the household socioeconomic
characteristics of each province were described among
quintiles in each province.
Health care needs and utilization, medical expenditures
and NCMS reimbursement for health services were com-
pared among each income quintile to show the protection
differences in NCMS. We calculated the CHE prevalence
of each income quintiles pre- and post-reimbursement,
and then compared their changes of each quintile. And the
CIs of the CHE prevalence, pre- and post-reimbursement,
were calculated to show equity change.
Continuous variables were analyzed by one-way
ANOVA to compare the differences in means, and cat-
egorical variables were analyzed by Chi-square test to
compare the differences in proportion. Data were
coded and computerized using EpiData 3.0 and ana-
lyzed with SPSS 12.0 and STATA 13.0.
The Ethics Committee of Tongji Medical College,
Huazhong University of Science and Technology ap-
proved the research proposal. All of the respondents
agreed an informed consent before they were interviewed.
Results
Table 2 showed the socioeconomic characteristics of the
households in each quintile of the three provinces. All of
the variables in each province, except H-aged in Hubei
and Chongqing, were significantly different among the
five income quintiles. There were fewer household mem-
bers, lower annual expenditures, more aged members,
less high level education and more farmers as vocation
in the poorest quintile than other quintiles in the three
provinces.
Table 3 showed the differences in health care needs and
utilization among each quintile. There were no significant
Table 1 Definitions and abbreviations of variables
Variable Definition Abbreviation Variable type
Household number Sampled household number H-num continuous
Household size Number of household members H-size categorical
Household annual
expenditure
The total expenditure of the whole household H-expend categorical
Household with aged members Number of individuals aged 60 years and over per household H-aged categorical
Household education level The highest level of education of any household member Edu-level categorical
Household vocation Vocation of household head H-voca categorical
Self-reported illness Frequency of self-reported illness in the past 14 days per household Self-ill continuous
Outpatient utilization Frequency of accessing outpatient services in the past 14 days per household Out-p continuous
Doctor suggesting inpatient Frequency of doctor suggesting inpatient services annually per household Sug-inp continuous
Inpatient utilization Frequency of accessing inpatient services annually per household In-p continuous
Expenditures of OTC Medical expenditures on over-the-counter medicine in the past 14 days
per household
OTC-expend continuous
Expenditures of outpatient Medical expenditures on outpatient services in the past 14 days per household Outp-expend continuous
OOP of outpatient OOP expenditures on outpatient services in the past 14 days per household Outp-OOP continuous
ERR of outpatient ERR of outpatient services in the past 14 days per household Outp-ERR continuous
Expenditures of inpatient Annual medical expenditures on inpatient services per household Inp-expend continuous
OOP of inpatient Annual OOP expenditures on inpatient services per household Inp-OOP continuous
ERR of inpatient ERR of inpatient services annually per household Inp-ERR continuous
Medical expenditures ratio The ratio of medical expenditures sharing the annual household expenditures
per household
Heal/Expend continuous
OOP ratio The ratio of OOP expenditures sharing the annual household expenditures
per household
OOP/Expend continuous
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Table 2 Socioeconomic characteristics of income quintile in each province
Province Socioeconomic characteristics Poorest (Q1) Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest (Q5) Total Sig.*
Hubei H-num (N) 241 169 136 60 27 633
H-size (N(%))
1–3 members 153(63.49) 63(37.28) 39(28.68) 11(18.33) 3(11.11) 269(42.50) χ2=81.178
4 members and more 88(36.51) 106(62.72) 97(71.32) 49(81.67) 24(88.89) 364(57.50) p<0.001
H-expend (N(%))
Less than ¥10,000 207(85.89) 48(28.40) 19(13.97) 3(5.00) 1(3.70) 278(43.92) χ2=415.619
¥10,000-30,000 31(12.86) 121(71.60) 98(72.06) 34(56.67) 11(40.74) 295(46.60) p<0.001
¥30,000 and more 3(1.24) 0(0.00) 19(13.97) 23(38.33) 15(55.56) 60(9.48)
H-aged (N(%))
0 95(39.42) 72(42.60) 76(55.88) 28(46.67) 12(44.44) 283(44.71) χ2 = 14.492
1 65(26.97) 50(29.59) 27(19.85) 12(20.00) 4(14.81) 158(24.96) p = 0.070
2 and more 81(33.61) 47(27.81) 33(24.26) 20(33.33) 11(40.74) 192(30.33)
Edu-level (N(%))
primary school 94(39.00) 22(13.02) 4(2.94) 1(1.67) 0(0.00) 121(19.12) χ2=106.928
further 147(61.00) 147(86.98) 132(97.06) 59(98.33) 27(100) 512(80.88) p<0.001
H-voca (N(%))
formal employee 6(2.49) 12(7.10) 11(8.09) 5(8.33) 1(3.70) 35(5.53) χ2=20.655
farmer 197(81.74) 120(71.01) 95(69.85) 35(58.33) 18(66.67) 465(73.46) p=0.008
informal employee 38(15.77) 37(21.89) 30(22.06) 20(33.33) 8(29.63) 133(21.01)
Chongqing H-num 155 184 88 33 38 498
H-size (N(%))
1–3 members 91(58.71) 67(36.41) 15(17.05) 9(27.27) 5(13.16) 187(37.55) χ2=56.601
4 members and more 64(41.29) 117(63.59) 73(82.95) 24(72.73) 33(86.84) 311(62.45) p<0.001
H-expend (N(%))
Less than ¥10,000 143(92.26) 36(19.57) 8(9.09) 3(9.09) 4(10.53) 194(38.96) χ2=440.401
¥10,000–30,000 11(7.10) 144(78.26) 70(79.55) 15(45.45) 9(23.68) 249(50.00) p<0.001
¥30,000 and more 1(0.65) 4(2.17) 10(11.36) 15(45.45) 25(65.79) 55(11.04)
H-aged (N(%))
0 46(29.68) 69(37.50) 36(40.91) 14(42.42) 15(39.47) 180(36.14) χ2 = 13.374
1 42(27.10) 40(21.74) 29(32.95) 11(33.33) 8(21.05) 130(26.10) p = 0.100
2 and more 67(43.23) 75(40.76) 23(26.14) 8(24.24) 15(39.47) 188(37.75)
Edu-level (N(%))
primary school 73(47.10) 41(22.28) 8(9.09) 4(12.12) 4(10.53) 130(26.10) χ2=58.133
further 82(52.90) 143(77.72) 80(90.91) 29(87.88) 34(89.47) 368(73.90) p<0.001
H-voca (N(%))
formal employee 2(1.29) 6(3.26) 6(6.82) 2(6.06) 1(2.63) 17(3.41) χ2=22.244
farmer 125(80.65) 131(71.20) 55(62.50) 19(57.58) 20(52.63) 350(70.28) p=0.004
informal employee 28(18.06) 47(25.54) 27(30.68) 12(36.36) 17(44.74) 131(26.31)
Zhejiang H-num 79 82 85 89 59 394
H-size (N(%))
1-3 members 68(86.08) 43(52.44) 21(24.71) 23(25.84) 9(15.25) 164(41.62) χ2=104.210
4 members and more 11(13.92) 39(47.56) 64(75.29) 66(74.16) 50(84.75) 230(58.38) p<0.001
H-expend (N(%))
Less than ¥10,000 65(82.28) 13(15.85) 1(1.18) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 79(20.05) χ2=398.122
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Table 2 Socioeconomic characteristics of income quintile in each province (Continued)
¥10,000–30,000 9(11.39) 63(76.83) 70(82.35) 35(39.33) 5(8.47) 182(46.19) p<0.001
¥30,000 and more 6(6.33) 6(7.32) 14(16.47) 54(60.67) 54(91.53) 133(33.76)
H-aged (N(%))
0 11(13.92) 34(41.46) 37(43.53) 53(59.55) 24(40.68) 159(40.36) χ2=40.031
1 32(40.51) 18(21.95) 18(21.18) 18(20.22) 18(30.51) 104(26.40) p<0.001
2 and more 36(45.57) 30(36.59) 30(35.29) 18(20.22) 17(28.81) 131(33.25)
Edu-level (N(%))
primary school 62(78.48) 27(32.93) 17(20.00) 3(3.37) 2(3.39) 111(28.71) χ2=147.491
further 17(21.52) 55(67.07) 68(80.00) 86(96.63) 57(96.61) 283(71.83) p<0.001
H-voca (N(%))
formal employee 0(0.00) 7(8.54) 8(9.41) 11(12.36) 5(8.47) 31(7.87) χ2=18.157
farmer 58(73.42) 46(56.10) 46(54.12) 43(48.31) 28(47.46) 221(56.09) p=0.020
informal employee 21(26.58) 29(35.37) 31(36.47) 35(39.33) 26(44.07) 142(36.04)
*α = 0.05
Table 3 Health care need and utilization of each income quintile
Province Health care need and utilization frequency Poorest (Q1) Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest (Q5) Total Sig.*
Hubei Self-ill (mean) 0.83 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.59 0.80 F = 0.378
p = 0.824
Out-p (mean) 0.38 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.33 0.39 F = 0.707
p = 0.587
Sug-inp (mean) 0.88 0.62 0.53 0.53 0.26 0.67 F = 2.248
p = 0.063
In-p (mean) 0.39 0.43 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.38 F = 0.679
p = 0.607
Chongqing Self-ill (mean) 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.58 0.63 0.69 F = 0.386
p = 0.819
Out-p (mean) 0.30 0.25 0.35 0.21 0.24 0.28 F = 0.812
p = 0.518
Sug-inp (mean) 0.65 0.63 0.42 0.67 0.55 0.59 F = 0.829
p = 0.507
In-p (mean) 0.43 0.41 0.32 0.67 0.50 0.42 F = 1.810
p = 0.125
Zhejiang Self-ill (mean) 0.46 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.71 0.53 F = 1.078
p = 0.367
Out-p (mean) 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.37 0.17 F=3.122
p=0.015
Sug-inp (mean) 0.29 0.20 0.36 0.30 0.44 0.31 F = 1.829
p = 0.122
In-p (mean) 0.27 0.17 0.35 0.30 0.39 0.29 F = 1.815
p = 0.125
*α = 0.05
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differences in all variables in the three provinces, except
Out-p in Zhejiang. The frequency of outpatient service
utilization was the highest in the richest quintile in
Zhejiang, even though the disease prevalence, indicated by
Self-ill, did not significantly differ among the quintiles.
Table 4 presents the medical expenditures and NCMS
reimbursement of each quintile. Heal/Expend was sig-
nificantly different among the quintiles in the three
provinces, in particular, it was the highest in the poorest
quintile but the lowest in the richest quintile. But OOP/
Expend was significantly different among the quintiles
only in Chongqing, which also was the highest in the
poorest quintile but the lowest in the richest quintile.
And Outp-expend and Inp-ERR were significantly differ-
ent among the quintiles only in Zhejiang. Outp-expend
was the highest in the richest quintile but the lowest in
the poorest quintile, while Inp-ERR was the highest in the
poorest quintile but the lowest in the middle quintile.
The most evident gap between Heal/Expend and OOP/
Expend was found in the poorest quintile of Hubei, and
the ratio of medical expenditures to household expendi-
tures was reduced to 325.55 % after NCMS reimburse-
ment. But even so, OOP payment of the poorest quintile
was almost the same as those households’ annual expendi-
tures in Hubei, or it was more than households’ annual ex-
penditures in Chongqing, after medical expenditures were
reimbursed by NCMS. Outp-ERR of most quintiles in the
three provinces was less than 20 %, and Inp-ERR of most
quintiles was less than 40 %. Both were far lower than the
designed NRR of NCMS plans in 2011.
Table 5 illustrates the prevalence of CHE and CIs pre-
and post-NCMS reimbursement. The prevalence of CHE
was significantly different among the quintiles in the three
provinces, whether pre- or post-reimbursement. Although
the obvious change of the CHE prevalence between pre-
and post-reimbursement occurred in the poorest or poorer
quintile of each province, the prevalence of CHE was still
considerably high in each quintile even after NCMS reim-
bursement. For instance, the prevalence of CHE was still
31.12 % in the overall Hubei sample. The CIs of CHE
prevalence, whether pre- or post-NCMS reimbursement,
were negative and close to 0 in the three provinces. How-
ever, the absolute values of CIs after NCMS reimbursement
were even more than those before reimbursement in the
three provinces, which implied the inequity exaggerated.
Discussion
The results of our study indicate the protection of NCMS
under current polices have taken some effects, because
the OOP payment was much less than the total medical
expenses. But the protection effectiveness was weak, for
OOP/Expend, a common indicator of financial burden,
was still extremely high, even after the NCMS reimburse-
ment for the outpatient and inpatient expenditures. And
the risk of CHE was still high in most of households, for
the prevalence of CHE was over 15 % in more than 3
quintiles of each province. These findings were aligned to
a system review by Liang X. et al. who declared no clear
evidence supported that NCMS could decrease the cata-
strophic health expenditure in Chinese rural population
[23]. To make it worse, NCMS did not provide fair finan-
cial protection, according to the change of the CIs of the
CHE prevalence. In addition, the availability of the care
among the poor was less than the richer, so remarkably
high burden expanded the primary inequity.
One reason leading to high OOP payment could be
the considerable gap existing between NRR and ERR,
mainly because of the limited benefit package that many
drugs or medical checks were uncovered. So, the ERR of
both outpatients and inpatients was far lower than the
promised NRR. Moreover, household spending on out-
patient services and drugs rather than on hospitalization
could be the primary contributor to medical impoverish-
ment according to Wagstaff ’s report [24]. Thus, insuffi-
cient outpatient reimbursement, reflected by the lower
NRR of outpatient than that of inpatient, in NCMS
could be an important reason causing high OOP pay-
ment, especially in low-income households. It have been
testified in our previous study which indicated that high
deductible for outpatient services creates a financial
burden for households containing people with chronic
diseases [25].
Unreasonable increasing in health expenses aggravated
the medical financial burden of low-income households.
According to Hu et al., fees that households in China paid
to access services nowadays were 18 times greater than
those in 1990 [26]. Liu Y. et al. and Wagstaff A. et al. all
found that the increasing health expense could drive many
families into poverty or sink them even further into poverty,
despite having health reimbursement [24, 27]. So, Li Y.
et al. recommended an upgrade of benefit packages was
needed and effective cost control mechanisms on the
provider side should be considered, because higher preva-
lence of catastrophic health expenditure and medical
impoverishment correlates to increased health care need,
even after NCMS reimbursement [28].
Apart from medical expenditure augmenting due to
price increase, services have been excessively delivered
to patients by health providers because of fee-for-service
payment mechanism. Meng Q. et al. reported that rapid
increases in health-care use and in demand (possibly
supplier-induced) have caused an escalation of medical
expenditures in a way that threatens the sustainability of
the scheme [29]. While payment reform on provider side,
such as pay-for-performance, was testified to be effective
to reduce antibiotic prescriptions and total spending per
visit to community health clinics according to Yie W.
et al. [30].
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Table 4 Health care expenditure and NCMS reimbursement of each income quintile
Province Health care expenditure Poorest (Q1) Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest (Q5) Total Sig.*
Hubei OTC-expend (¥) (mean) 27.76 41.70 23.58 44.83 46.22 32.99 F = 0.988
p = 0.413
Outp-expend (¥) (mean) 228.59 200.89 310.85 171.92 77.70 227.06 F = 1.154
p = 0.330
Outp-OOP (¥) (mean) 177.31 168.13 271.71 153.05 73.04 188.39 F = 0.955
p = 0.432
Outp-ERR (%) (mean) 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.08 0.16 0.16 F = 0.327
p = 0.859
Inp-expend (¥) (mean) 4501.58 2931.42 3600.59 2522.50 3025.93 3638.26 F = 0.317
p = 0.867
Inp-OOP (¥) (mean) 3491.86 1859.15 2388.59 1822.83 1980.37 2596.25 F = 0.490
p = 0.743
Inp-ERR (%) (mean) 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.35 0.42 0.40 F = 0.371
p = 0.829
Heal/Expend (%) (mean) 422.60 108.10 69.52 44.49 19.06 209.72 F=2.417
p=0.048
OOP/Expend (%) (mean) 97.05 92.29 57.94 37.26 13.41 78.14 F = 0.033
p = 0.998
Chongqing OTC-expend (¥) (mean) 22.65 29.27 56.04 12.30 25.71 30.54 F = 2.320
p = 0.056
Outp-expend (¥) (mean) 136.55 117.89 189.66 44.24 82.79 128.82 F = 0.995
p = 0.410
Outp-OOP (¥) (mean) 125.73 95.31 152.11 32.24 80.18 109.48 F = 0.827
p = 0.508
Outp-ERR (%) (mean) 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.15 F = 0.415
p = 0.797
Inp-expend (¥) (mean) 2665.23 2170.43 2885.34 2950.00 1590.26 2458.15 F = 0.372
p = 0.828
Inp-OOP (¥) (mean) 1757.00 1527.72 2346.14 2184.85 1072.50 1752.51 F = 0.466
p = 0.761
Inp-ERR (%) (mean) 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.46 0.37 0.37 F = 0.587
p = 0.672
Heal/Expend (%) (mean) 178.39 46.78 41.22 26.15 17.84 83.18 F=5.445
p<0.001
OOP/Expend (%) (mean) 148.51 37.04 33.88 15.80 15.76 68.14 F=5.371
p<0.001
Zhejiang OTC-expend (¥) (mean) 44.18 55.85 39.41 47.35 57.51 48.29 F = 0.222
p = 0.926
Outp-expend (¥) (mean) 35.70 136.77 61.76 129.55 270.00 118.64 F=3.230
p=0.013
Outp-OOP (¥) (mean) 30.76 122.74 52.00 124.16 204.71 101.63 F = 2.248
p = 0.063
Outp-ERR (%) (mean) 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.14 F = 0.787
p = 0.539
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Meanwhile, insurance may prompt the insured individ-
uals to obtain more expensive care than their needs, and
result in increasing levels of OOP spending, which had
already happened in China’s urban insurance scheme [5].
Zhang Y. et al. have illustrated that patients tend to exag-
gerate their health needs to seek expensive inpatient ser-
vices instead of staying in the outpatient department,
because reimbursement for outpatient services was much
less than inpatient in NCMS [31]. In our study, the richest
households rather than the poor ones have more out-
patient services times, with a prerequisite that no signifi-
cant difference of self-reported illness times. Whitehead
et al. revealed that the phenomena of irrational drug use
and prescription in low-income countries were associated
with large OOP drug payments and led to the medical
poverty trap [16].
Moreover, high OOP payment could exacerbate the
weak financial protection of NCMS, because the equity
measure (i.e. the CIs) got worse after NCMS reimburse-
ment based on our findings. Yang W. also reported that
OOP payment was concentrated disproportionately
among the poor even after NCMS reimbursement [32],
and income-related inequity in access to health care was
not decreased after the expansion of NCMS across the
rural China [33]. Van Minh et al. demonstrated that the
high proportion of household direct OOP payment
reflected an inequity issue in a health system in general,
because the amount of OOP payment can be highly re-
lated to income [34]. In our study, the poor households
were more vulnerable than the others, because they had
fewer household members, less annual income, more
aged members, less education and higher proportion of
Table 4 Health care expenditure and NCMS reimbursement of each income quintile (Continued)
Inp-expend (¥) (mean) 3950.00 3251.22 2865.88 2284.83 2683.05 3004.82 F = 0.254
p = 0.907
Inp-OOP (¥) (mean) 2227.22 2394.51 2154.12 1652.25 1762.71 2046.83 F = 0.104
p = 0.981
Inp-ERR (%) (mean) 0.46 0.35 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.28 F=4.515
p=0.002
Heal/Expend (%) (mean) 95.98 49.46 21.74 21.56 27.19 43.17 F=2.595
p=0.036
OOP/Expend (%) (mean) 64.54 41.91 18.23 19.70 21.54 33.27 F = 1.884
p = 0.112
*α = 0.05
Table 5 Prevalence of CHE and CIs before and after NCMS reimbursement








93(38.59 %) 50(29.59 %) 38(27.94 %) 13(21.67 %) 3(11.11 %) 197(31.12 %) χ2=14.643 −0.1190
p=0.006
Change(Pre-Post) 7(2.90 %) 10(5.91 %) 6(4.41 %) 3(5.00 %) 1(3.70 %) 27(4.27 %) —— 0.0260
Chongqing Pre-reimbursement
(N (%))




69(44.52 %) 41(22.28 %) 19(21.59 %) 3(9.09 %) 2(5.26 %) 134(26.91 %) χ2=42.080 −0.2495
p<0.001
Change(Pre-Post) 5(3.22 %) 8(4.35 %) 14(3.41 %) 0(0.00 %) 1(2.63 %) 17(3.41 %) —— 0.0216
Zhejiang Pre-reimbursement
(N (%))




24(30.38 %) 16(19.51 %) 12(14.12 %) 8(8.99 %) 10(16.95 %) 70(17.77 %) χ2=14.269 −0.1821
p=0.006
Change(Pre-Post) 3(3.80 %) 5(6.10 %) 5(5.88 %) 4(4.49 %) 2(3.36 %) 19(4.82 %) —— 0.0323
*α = 0.05
Ma et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:72 Page 9 of 11
farmers. In addition, the level of OOP payment sharing
of annual household expenditures greater than 40 % can
result in inequity in health care, according to WHO [5].
In fact, OOP/Expend of Hubei and Chongqing was
78.14 and 68.14 % (see Table 4) respectively in our study.
So, high OOP payment would reduce the health services
affordability of the needy population, and decrease the
protection equity finally.
Another reason that caused inequitable protection in
NCMS could be inequity in financing. The universal
coverage should be financed on the basis of the ability to
pay, and the benefits received should be based on the
needs for health care in health systems [30]. Income-
related financing of health insurance has been widely
used in many countries, even for the informal employee
sector, such as in South Africa [30] and Mexico [35].
However, households had to pay a flat-rate premium for
NCMS in rural China, which meant all of the house-
holds, regardless of variant income levels, paid the same
premiums within a county. Therefore, regressive finan-
cing in NCMS made the poor households bear heavier
burden than the rich, and the rich, who have spare
money, were urged to avail more health services than
what they actually need.
This study is characterized by several limitations.
First, the estimations were based on self-reported ill-
nesses and the corresponding costs rather than on
those diagnosed by a physician and expense informa-
tion system. Thus, the information may be either over-
or under-reported. However, the questions used to
describe the self-reporting of illnesses and the corre-
sponding costs were obtained from the National Health
Services Survey, which has been validated nationally.
Second, the protection of NCMS was underestimated
because the OOP payment sharing of annual household
expenditures would be exaggerated compared with a
unit of individual when the protection was calculated
as a unit of household. In terms of the smallest risk-
sharing unit, the calculation based on the household
unit was much closer to the actual status of coping with
medical financial burden. Third, three provinces sam-
pled specifically could only reflect limited effectiveness
of NCMS in China. And we believed that the actual
NCMS protection level of rural residents had got fur-
ther promoted since 2011, with NCMS reform keeping
implemented.
Conclusion
Although modified NCMS policies could reduce medical
financial burden for rural residents to some extent, the
protection effectiveness was still limited, and the result of
NCMS reimbursement aggravated health inequity. Firstly,
policymakers should decrease the high OOP payment by
expanding the benefit package with expanding the drug
list and check directory of NCMS to minimize the gap be-
tween NRR and ERR. Then, the increasing of medical ex-
penditures should be controlled by monitoring excess
demand from both providers and patients, and modifying
fee-for-service payment for providers to a prospective pay-
ment system. Service accessibility and affordability of vul-
nerable rural residents should be protected by changing
regressive financing in NCMS, and by providing extra aid
and reimbursement from government.
Lessons from three provinces in China provided evi-
dence that the modified health insurance plans could not
guarantee financial protection effectiveness and equity.
Periodic monitor and assessment could help adjust such
policies timely to achieve the designed aims.
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